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Maximizing the Value of America’s Newest Resource, LowAltitude Airspace: An Economic Analysis of Aerial Trespass
and Drones
TYLER WATSON
INTRODUCTION
Congress’s push to integrate drones into the national airspace1 has attracted billions
in funding to explore new uses of low-altitude airspace by drones, drastically
increasing the value of that airspace to society.2 However, current regulation
significantly restricts the commercial exploitation of this airspace,3 and the absence
of clear property rights has incited public animosity towards potentially intrusive
drones.4 In response, there has been a flood of literature addressing, among other
things, the property rights of landowners and whether those rights include the right
to exclude drones from flying over their land, and if so, at what altitude does that
right end. While much of this literature claims the common law doctrine of aerial
trespass to be inadequate, the arguments are premised on the assumption that the goal
of the traditional trespass to land doctrine is to protect landowners’ privacy rights,
and therefore, the goal of aerial trespass should also be to protect these privacy
rights.5

 J.D. Candidate, 2020, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. M.B.A. Candidate,
2020, Indiana University Kelley School of Business. B.S. in Economics, Purdue University,
Krannert School of Management.
1. In 2012, Congress directed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to develop a
“comprehensive plan” for “a phased-in approach to the integration of civil unmanned aircraft
systems into the national airspace system.” FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub.
L. No. 112-95, § 332, 126 Stat. 11, 73–75; see also FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, H.R.
302, 115th Cong. § 370 (2018).
2. See Pamela Cohn, Alastair Green, Meredith Langstaff & Melanie Roller, Commercial
Drones Are Here: The Future of Unmanned Aerial Systems, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Dec.
2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights
/commercial-drones-are-here-the-future-of-unmanned-aerial-systems [https://perma.cc/GX
5K-CVC2] (stating that drone start-ups have received over $3 billion in investment funding
and that the value of commercial drone activity in the United States has risen from $40 million
in 2012 to over $1 billion in 2017).
3. See, e.g., Dave Marcontell & Steve Douglas, Why the Use of Drones Still Faces Big
Regulatory Hurdles, FORBES (Sep. 10, 2018, 8:08 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/oliverwyman/2018/09/10/why-the-use-of-drones-still-faces-big-regulatory-hurdles/#200d35
ea1c0d [https://perma.cc/Z4PD-FD37] (stating that reaching the full economic potential of
widespread commercial use of drones will take new regulation and advances in technology to
mitigate the safety risks of their more transformative applications).
4. See Cohn et al., supra note 2 (stating that the most “vital” factor the future of drones
depends on is the issue of public acceptance). “Attitudes may soften as drones become more
common, but the industry has to build a lot of confidence before people will accept thousands
of them flying overhead or board [drone] air taxis.” Id.
5. See generally Hillary B. Farber, Keep Out! The Efficacy of Trespass, Nuisance and
Privacy Torts as Applied to Drones, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 380–92 (2017) (focusing on
the application of legacy torts and whether they adequately protect privacy rights of
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In an attempt to alleviate the public’s privacy concerns and minimize litigation
between landowners and drone operators, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) has
taken it upon itself to redefine the property rights to this new, valuable resource by
drafting an inflexible “bright[-]line” per se aerial trespass rule that cuts the
commercially exploitable airspace in half, potentially stifling innovation if adopted.6
In the months following the ULC’s release of its draft Tort Law Relating to Drones
Act, negative reactions by industry and commercial stakeholders led the ULC’s
drafting committee to offer two alternatives in its next draft, released in October
2018.7 From an economic perspective, the likely side effect of such a rule is an
inefficient allocation of this valuable resource, and therefore the rule—including its
two proposed alternatives—should be rejected by state legislators. The economic
analysis put forth in this Note is intended to provide a different perspective on the
issues the ULC is responding to with its proposed rules and to highlight the potential
economic side effects that might come from prematurely adopting such a rule without
giving society time to adjust to an evolving drone industry that is still in its infancy.
Recognizing that tort law is a unique area of law that was judicially created by
rational human beings with an innate sense of economic justice, this Note seeks to
apply positive economic theory—derived from ex post analyses of tort cases—to an
ex ante analysis to predict how and to what extent the existing and proposed aerial
trespass rules will further economic efficiency in the context of drones and airspace
rights. Part I will provide (1) an overview of the Federal Aviation Administration’s
(FAA) current regulatory framework and the development of the common law aerial
trespass doctrine and (2) an overview of the debate surrounding landowners’
property rights and drones by discussing the ULC’s proposed per se aerial trespass
rule and the reactions of various stakeholders that led to the proposal of the two

landowners); Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 354 (2016) (focusing on the Fourth Amendment’s protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures).
6. See TORT LAW RELATING TO DRONES ACT prefatory note at 8 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
Discussion Draft for Annual Meeting, 2018) [hereinafter Draft for Annual Meeting],
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=acc3dee9-7ab6-24e3-ee55-ad3e09a82c6a&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/WJL44NGS]. The ULC’s proposed trespass rule, Section 301, is supposedly intended to benefit both
landowners and drone operators, as well as “ensure the success of the unmanned aircraft
industry by helping to resolve issues related to public acceptance of this technology.” Id.
at 10.
7. Industry’s negative reactions are discussed in Section I.B.2, infra, and the proposed
alternatives are discussed in Section III.D, infra. See also TORT LAW RELATING TO DRONES
ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Discussion Draft for Oct. 26–28, 2018 Drafting Committee
Meeting) [hereinafter Draft for Drafting Committee Meeting], https://www.uniformlaws.org
/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=fd068f11-b1f3-074
d-5f4f-7ea3b93c11f3&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/4FGS-R6FB]; Memorandum from
Paul Kurtz, Chair, & Robert Heverly, Associate Reporter, to the Unif. Law Comm’n, Drafting
Comm., Tort Law Relating to Drones Act (Oct. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Oct. 19, 2018 Memo],
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=9110516a-3d32-31b8-2a19-fd42b84bb022&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/ZE6T
-594M].
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alternative rules mentioned above. Part II will attempt to clarify the property rights
of landowners to the airspace above their land and argue that the ULC’s proposal is
premised on a flawed assumption that aerial trespass should be treated as trespass to
land. Part III will compare the economic efficiency of these proposed rules with the
existing doctrine in place by applying an ex ante positive economic analysis to show
that the common law doctrine of aerial trespass is economically superior to the
ULC’s per se and alternative aerial trespass rules.
I.

INTEGRATION OF DRONES INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE & THE AERIAL
TRESPASS DOCTRINE

In June 2016 the FAA concluded the first phase of its plan to integrate drones into
the National Airspace System (NAS) by announcing its highly anticipated final rule
for the operation and certification of small unmanned aircraft systems, more
commonly known as drones.8 The rule, known as Part 107, establishes a framework
that enables drone operations for commercial purposes without requiring an
airworthiness certification or exemption.9 Building upon Part 107, a “foundational
operating rule” that posed the least amount of public risk, the FAA will gradually
develop regulations that deviate from the rule’s operational restrictions when such
deviations would enable routine and safe operations.10
The key provision of Part 107 that prompted questions surrounding landowners’
property rights and their ability to exclude drones from the airspace above their land
is the operational height restriction. Unlike regulations for manned aircraft, which
set minimum safe altitudes at 500 feet and above, Part 107 sets a maximum altitude
of 400 feet above ground level (AGL)—or within a 400-foot radius of a structure—
but no minimum.11 Because the FAA’s regulations focus on safety rather than
privacy,12 states must determine whether their existing laws provide adequate legal
remedies to landowners against intrusive drones.13 The technological capabilities of
drones make it relatively easy for operators to capture images or videos of the inside

8. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg.
42,064 (June 28, 2016) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2019)); see also 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2019);
supra note 1.
9. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at
42,076. For detailed information on the types of commercial exemptions granted under Section
333 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, see Commercial Exemptions: By the
Numbers, AUVSI, https://www.auvsi.org/our-impact/commercial-exemptions-numbers
[https://perma.cc/ZKJ9-QYD3] (data current through Aug. 29, 2016).
10. See FAA, INTEGRATION OF CIVIL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) IN THE
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (NAS) ROADMAP 32–33 (2d ed. 2018) [hereinafter FAA UAS
ROADMAP], https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/policy_library/media/Second_Edition_Integra
tion_of_Civil_UAS_NAS_Roadmap_July%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB5X-5RCL]; see
also Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,065.
11. Draft for Annual Meeting, supra note 6, prefatory note at 3, 11. For the text of the
regulation, see 14 C.F.R. § 107.51(b) (2019).
12. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at
42,190 (“[T]he FAA notes that its mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace
system in the world, and does not include regulating privacy.”).
13. Farber, supra note 5, at 364–65.
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of someone’s home without physically trespassing on the property.14 Trespass,
however, is one of the existing laws that policymakers15 and academics suggest
should be modified to protect the privacy of landowners.16
A. Aerial Trespass
Historically, airspace rights in the United States have been relatively static. The
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Causby marked the one time in our
history that these rights have been redefined.17 The widespread use of airplanes and
the benefit of public transit that they provided necessitated further delineation of
these rights.18
Before Causby, airspace rights were defined by the ad coelum doctrine, which
gave landowners, who had property rights to the surface of the land, property rights
to the airspace above the land, “stretching indefinitely up to the sky,”19 as part of
their bundle of rights to the surface.20 The property line boundaries determined who

14. Id. at 402.
The privacy concerns relating to drones stem from their capabilities. These aerial
observers enable operators to gather information about people and places via
cameras, live video-streaming capability, and sensory-enhancing technologies
that can be mounted to the drone. . . . [T]he drones’ aerial positioning makes it
difficult for anyone without prior notice to avoid being caught on their cameras.
Id. at 362.
15. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Robert A. Hazel, Privacy and Trade Secret Law Applied to Drones: An
Economic Analysis, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 340, 363 (2018) (“[V]ertical property
rights should emerge or, in this case, re-emerge below 200 feet. At this altitude, drone
operations should be considered a trespass and property owners should be permitted to exclude
them.”). Robert Hazel’s argument for trespass below 200 feet is entirely dependent on the
assumption that drone operations below this altitude impose “much higher privacy costs while
offering minimal additional economic benefits.” Id. at 362. Unfortunately, Hazel does not cite
any evidence to support this assumption. Moreover, Hazel recognizes that the increasingly
sophisticated cameras drones can carry are capable of capturing the same detailed images a
normal camera could at thirty feet but at an altitude above 200 feet, requiring the separate tort
of intrusion upon seclusion to protect the privacy of landowners. Id. at 352, 374. Thus, this
leaves the “unnerving” presence of drones at lower altitudes as the only argument left to
support his trespass argument. See id. at 362. However, “a cause of action that is dependent
on proximity to real property is of little or no utility in the drone context.” Farber, supra note
5, at 389.
17. 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (holding that the flights of various military aircraft—
bombers, transports, and fighter jets—over the plaintiffs’ land constituted a taking because
they were “so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the
enjoyment and use of the land”).
18. See infra notes 25 and accompanying text.
19. Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 167 (2015) (stating
that the ad coelum doctrine “purported to give surface owners property rights stretching
indefinitely up to the sky”).
20. The ad coelum doctrine is the more commonly known name for the phrase “‘Cujus
est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum,’ or ‘[t]o whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to
the sky . . . .’” Id. at 166 (quoting Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, BLACK’S LAW
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owned what column of air.21 This old English doctrine remained the law until 1946,
when the Causby Court held that the doctrine had “no place in the modern world.”22
Recognizing that “[t]he airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the
inconveniences which it causes are normally not compensable,”23 the Court justified
Congress’s declaration that the navigable airspace is a “public highway”24 because
the recognition of “private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
seriously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and
transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.” 25
Causby made it clear that, according to Congress’s definition of “navigable
airspace,” all airspace 500 feet and above was public airspace.26 The Court, however,
was less clear about who owned the airspace below 500 feet, stating that landowners
held exclusive rights to airspace within the “immediate reaches” of their land.27 The
Court declined to determine the precise altitude that the “immediate reaches” ended
and the navigable airspace began.28
Prior to the arrival of drones, the Causby Court’s decision not to define the
immediate reaches had not been problematic because FAA regulations set a
minimum altitude for manned aircraft at 500 feet, excluding takeoff and landing. 29
The aerial trespass doctrine was created against this backdrop of laws and regulations
that have traditionally ensured that most manned aircraft would fly at safe distances
from people and property in high-altitude airspace.30 For safe operations of drones,
on the other hand, the FAA has determined that drones should be operated in lowaltitude airspace, away from manned aircraft.31 In aerial trespass cases, “[f]light by
[an] aircraft in the air space above the land of another is a trespass if, but only if, (a)
it enters into the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and (b) it
interferes substantially with the other’s use and enjoyment of his land.”32

DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
21. See Rule, supra note 19, at 166 (stating that the ad coelum doctrine “assigned airspace
rights based on ownership of the surface land situated immediately below the space”).
22. Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–61.
23. Id. at 266.
24. Id. at 260–61 (stating that the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 granted U.S. citizens “a public right of freedom of transit in air commerce through
the navigable airspace of the United States”) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 403 (repealed 1947)). The
“public right of transit through the navigable airspace” is currently codified at 49 U.S.C. §
40103(a)(2) (2012).
25. Causby, 328 U.S. at 261.
26. Id. at 260, 263, 266 (“The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land,
is part of the public domain.”).
27. Id. at 264.
28. Id. at 266.
29. Draft for Annual Meeting, supra note 6, prefatory note at 1, 11.
30. Id.
31. See id.; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added).
The development of the aerial trespass doctrine by the federal courts is based primarily on
Causby, even though it was a Fifth Amendment takings case. See id. at § 159(2) reporter’s
notes to subsec. (2) (stating that aerial trespass is based primarily on Causby); see also id. at §
159(2) cmt. k (stating that subsequent federal cases have limited aerial trespass to cases such
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B. The ULC’s Tort Law Relating to Drones Act
The Causby decision has historically only been relevant in subsequent takings
cases where a public airport, owned by a state or local government, was so close to
privately occupied land that the glide path of aircraft taking off and landing at the
airport was so low that it interfered with the use and enjoyment of private land.33
Today, the emergence of drones, “which operate in greater numbers and much closer
to the ground than manned aircraft,” has necessitated a reevaluation of the concept
of “immediate reaches” as it pertains to the common law aerial trespass doctrine.34
The proponents of the ULC’s bright-line per se aerial trespass rule argue that the
existing doctrine will result in costly litigation and fail to protect landowners from
intrusive drones.35
1.

Per Se Aerial Trespass

The proposed per se aerial trespass rule was discussed at the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July 2018.36 The language of the rule
is as follows:
A person operating an unmanned aircraft is liable to a land owner or
lessee for per se aerial trespass, when the person, without consent,
intentionally causes the unmanned aircraft to enter into the airspace
below [200] feet above the surface of land or below [200] feet above
improvements built upon the surface of land.37
The rationale for the rule is “premised upon a conclusion that laws crafted
specifically for manned aircraft do not adequately provide clarity or uniformity”
needed to address “the ability of drones to enter low altitude airspace adjacent to
property” and “to surreptitiously gather information in a manner that may be

as Causby, “so that, even though there is a flight below the prescribed minimum altitude, there
is no trespass unless there is such interference with actual, as distinguished from potential,
use” of land).
33. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny Cty., 369 U.S. 84 (1962). After Causby, Congress
enacted the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, which redefined “navigable airspace” to mean
“airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations . . . and shall include
airspace needed to [e]nsure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft.” Pub. L. 85-726, 72 Stat.
731, 739 (1958). In Griggs, the Supreme Court held that a taking had occurred even though
the landing planes were within the navigable airspace as Congress redefined it in 1958. Griggs,
369 U.S. at 88–90.
34. Draft for Annual Meeting, supra note 6, prefatory note at 1.
35. For a summary of the arguments supporting this proposition, see id. prefatory note at
3–8.
36. See id. For a list of the drafting committee members and an archive of current and
previous drafts, see Tort Law Relating to Drones Committee, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION (2017),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=2cb85e0d-0a3
2-4182-adee-ee15c7e1eb20 [https://perma.cc/MNC4-JSQ9].
37. Draft for Annual Meeting, supra note 6, § 301(a).
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offensive to a reasonable person.”38 The drafting committee concluded that the
existing aerial trespass doctrine “operates more like a nuisance suit than a right to
exclude” because it requires proof of harm (a showing of substantial interference)
that, when applied to drones, “will likely not allow for a right of exclusion of [drones]
at nearly any altitude, thereby swallowing property rights and engendering public
backlash against drone operators.”39
2.

Industry Reaction

The drone community, particularly companies and associations representing the
drone industry,40 criticized the proposals in the draft act on three grounds.41 First, the
opponents of the draft act argue that the per se aerial trespass rule, which creates a
“No Fly zone” below 200 feet, would be preempted because the federal government
has exclusive authority to regulate aircraft flight, including altitude.42 The second
argument is that existing tort law doctrines—battery, intrusion upon seclusion,
nuisance, and trespass—are more than adequate and the drafting committee’s
deliberate choice to base the per se rule on physical trespass to land, and to give
landowners an absolute right to exclude drones, creates an “inflexible line in the sky”
that is ill-informed and inconsistent with existing tort law on aerial trespass.43 The

38. Memorandum from Paul Kurtz, Chair, & Gregory S. McNeal, Reporter, to the Unif.
Law Comm’n 1 (June 14, 2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System
/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=c87bc092-376e-aa43-cf8f-4adf4155400a
&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/7E3H-JH9B].
39. Id. at 4–5.
40. See, e.g., All. for Drone Innovation et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort
Law Relating to Drones Act (July 5, 2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic
/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=6ec36eed-5f99-8940-abf1-691f8
eddeb03&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/56YC-5SNR] .
41. David P. Fidler, The Drone Revolution Shakes Up Tort Law, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/drone-revolution-shakes-tort-law
[https://perma.cc/56ZC-MAGW].
42. See, e.g., Commercial Drone All., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law
Relating to Drones Act (July 23, 2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic
/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=a1fcc136-670b-43d5-7cdb-e3c0c
c8ead95&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/4MX5-PJUS]. Additionally, the FAA has made
numerous attempts to emphasize its authority over the national airspace and that any state
regulation of that airspace is in conflict with Congress’s intent to occupy the entire field (i.e.,
field preemption). Miriam McNabb, The FAA Stance on State Drone Regulation: Preemption
Is Still Preemption, but There’s a Loophole, DRONELIFE (July 24, 2018), https://dronelife.com
/2018/07/24/faa-stance-on-state-drone-regulation-preemption-is-still-preemption/ [https://per
ma.cc/V7X5-EB69]; see also U.S. Dep’t of Transp. & FAA, Comment Letter Proposed
Uniform Tort Law Relating to Drones Act (July 11, 2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org
/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=21ef3370-77ea-5d3
9-cdb9-8d7816698cac&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/EW9T-D2NE] (stating that a per se
rule “would be in tension with decades of established precedent in the Federal courts, which
have rejected the notion of applying the traditional elements of basic trespass law to aircraft
overflight of private property”).
43. All. for Drone Innovation et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law
Relating to Drones Act, supra note 40, at 2.
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committee has expressly acknowledged that drones do not cause the kind of harm
(substantial interference) that traditional aerial trespass recognizes, particularly from
noise.44 Rather than acknowledge the implications of the lack of harm—that there is
no need for a law that restricts an activity that does not cause cognizable harm—the
committee chose to redefine the law so that no interference or impact on the
landowner’s use and enjoyment of the land is required; the mere presence of a drone
causes per se harm.45
Lastly, they argue that the per se rule would increase litigation rather than reduce
it and fails to strike an appropriate balance between innovation and personal
privacy.46 The rule will not reduce litigation because it is “premised on the flawed
notion that [it] will eliminate the need for ‘a fact-specific inquiry which has
historically caused uncertainty and a lack of uniformity.’”47 To the contrary, the
certainty provided by a uniform “line in the sky” is illusory because any claim
brought under the proposed rule would still require a fact-specific inquiry to
determine whether the drone was in fact over the claimant’s property, whether
consent was given, and whether the drone was at an altitude below 200 feet.48 While
a fact-specific inquiry under the per se rule may at first be less costly than one that
must determine whether substantial interference occurred, “the technological
components of a holistic drone integration and aerospace management regime will
certainly include remote ID and UAS traffic management systems, with forensic
accuracy and reliability, which will make fact-finding a trivial operation” in either
scenario. 49 Instead, the proposed per se rule “would shift the burden of proof to drone
operators,” 50 increasing the likelihood that landowners will file erroneous claims, 51

44. Id.; see also Draft for Annual Meeting, supra note 6, prefatory note at 7 (stating that
courts have found that noise alone is not substantial interference in aerial trespass cases).
45. Acad. of Model Aeronautics et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law
Relating to Drones Act (Oct. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Comment from Acad. of Model
Aeronautics et al.], https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocument
File.ashx?DocumentFileKey=7c08578d-c00a-5752-bdf9-084d5e75c788&forceDialog=0
[https://perma.cc/Z6EP-5M3Y].
46. All. for Drone Innovation et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law
Relating to Drones Act, supra note 40, at 1–2.
47. Comment from Acad. of Model Aeronautics et al., supra note 45, at 2 (citing Draft
for Annual Meeting, supra note 6, at 5).
48. Id.
49. WhiteFox Def. Techs., Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law Relating
to Drones Act (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/Systemz/Down
loadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=0c631ecc-9771-be28-5ec1-7ccd68ebf9e8&force
Dialog=0 [https://perma.cc/Q8US-V92Q]. WhiteFox Defense is an airspace management
company. Id. at 1. For a brief overview of the FAA’s plans regarding remote ID and Unmanned
Aircraft Systems traffic management, see FAA UAS ROADMAP, supra note 10, at 19–20,
34–35.
50. WhiteFox Def. Techs., Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law Relating
to Drones Act, supra 49, at 1.
51. Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law
Relating to Drones Act (July 24, 2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System
/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=7408559f-8737-faa5-7d02-7e957c2c83a9
&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/Q6CB-BHNM]. The difference between existing doctrine
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and “eviscerate the social and commercial benefits of drones.”52 The existing
doctrine, on the other hand, permits courts to consider both the rights of private
property owners to the use and enjoyment of their property as well as the public
interest in the integration of drones into the national airspace, thereby striking a
balance between innovation and personal privacy.53
In general, the opponents of the per se rule do not dismiss the need for regulatory
and legislative reform that clarifies the responsibilities of drone operators and
protects the public’s reasonable interests in privacy.54 Instead, they believe that
Congress, and thus the FAA, should have the exclusive authority to regulate so as to
avoid an unbalanced and inflexible legal landscape that stifles innovation. Although
landowners have a reasonable right to ensure their property is safe from disruptive
interference with their use and enjoyment of land, “the moral entitlements of a person
to the enjoyment of their land (i.e. the grounds for their reasonable complaint against
trespass) are technologically contextual”—that is, they depend on the technology
currently available and in widespread use.55
II. COMMON LAW AERIAL TRESPASS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS POST-CAUSBY
In general, the ULC’s bright-line per se aerial trespass rule is supported by two
arguments. 56 First, it is argued that there is a lack of clarity regarding landowners’
property rights due to the ambiguity of the term “immediate reaches.”57 Second, it is
argued that the existing doctrine inadequately protects landowners’ property rights
because the proof of harm requirement (substantial interference) operates more like
a nuisance suit, a claim for compensation for harm suffered, rather than traditional
trespass to land, which stems from the landowner’s right to exclude.58 The goal of
Section II.A is to shed some light on the current state of landowners’ property rights

and a per se rule is the per se rule will lead to more litigation because landowners would be
more likely to file erroneous claims either because of their own inaccurate assessments of the
drone’s location, id., or just because they can, even though the drone did not cause any harm
and merely zipped across the property at an altitude just above the tree line.
52. WhiteFox Def. Techs., Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law Relating
to Drones Act, supra note 49, at 1.
53. News Media Coal., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law Relating to
Drones Act (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/Download
DocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=0d27c1f7-ff43-1122-f632-d8d55b148970&forceDia
log=0 [https://perma.cc/2MXQ-SMPA].
54. WhiteFox Def. Techs., Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law Relating
to Drones Act, supra note 49, at 1; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (quoting the
drafting committee’s rationale for the per se rule, which is premised on the need to protect
reasonable interests in privacy).
55. WhiteFox Def. Techs., Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law Relating
to Drones Act, supra note 49, at 1.
56. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 34, 38 and accompanying text; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 159(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating that aerial trespass requires a showing that the drone
entered into the “immediate reaches” of private land).
58. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. But see supra note 45 and accompanying
text.
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after Causby. Section II.B will argue that the ULC’s inadequacy argument is
premised on a flawed assumption that aerial trespass should be treated as trespass to
land.
A. Clarification of Property Rights Under Causby
Generally, landowners have the right to exclusive use and control of their land,
which, prior to Causby, was thought to include all airspace from the surface and
above.59 In Causby, the Supreme Court, by quickly dismissing the “ancient” ad
coelum doctrine,60 subconsciously (if not consciously) recognized that changes in
technology had given rise to a more efficient use of that airspace,61 and as such, the
optimal level of interference with the use and enjoyment of the private land below
was no longer zero.62 The problem, however, is that the landowners had suffered a
substantial amount of harm63 and the Court could not compensate the landowners for
that harm under traditional tort doctrines because the government is protected from
tort liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.64 If it were not for the
significance of the harm suffered by the landowner, the Court “could have simply
allowed the government to invade the Causby’s airspace without paying any
compensation” and the taking would have still been an efficient reallocation of
resources.65

59. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
60. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946).
61. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW 15
(1992) (stating that the reallocation of airspace in Causby was “almost certainly wealth
maximizing” (i.e., efficient) because the landowners’ loss “was a necessary sacrifice”).
62. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of changes in
technology on the optimal level of harm caused by an activity).
63. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 259 (stating that military bombers and fighter jets flew so
low over the landowners’ property that they scared the landowners’ chickens to death,
literally).
64. Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion in Causby, made some compelling arguments
that seem to support the proposition that the creation of new property rights, or the adjustment
of property rights to airspace, is limited to federal regulation and that the role of common law,
and the courts, is to protect, not create, property rights. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 271 (Black,
J., dissenting). Justice Black argued that if it were not for sovereign immunity, the landowners’
remedy would have been based in tort—i.e. nuisance, a violation of statute, or negligence—
and that the “future adjustment of the rights and remedies of property owners, which might be
found necessary because of the . . . imminent expansion of air navigation, [should] be left
where . . . the Constitution left it, with Congress.” Id.; see also Draft for Drafting Committee
Meeting, supra note 7, prefatory note at 5 (“It was not clear whether the Court ordered
compensation based on a trespass theory—because the overflights penetrated the Causbys’
airspace—or based on a nuisance theory—because the flights substantially interfered with the
Causbys’ use and enjoyment of their land.”) (quoting James C. Smith, Airspace, in
NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNERS § 5:03 (1988)).
65. BARNES & STOUT, supra note 61, at 15. “A reallocation without compensation may
also maximize utility and wealth. If a decisionmaker (such as a court or legislature) knows for
certain which resource use generates the most utility or is valued most highly then
compensation is unnecessary.” Id.
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Instead, the Court tried to reach a “just” conclusion by shortening the airspace
“stick” in the “bundle of sticks” that accompany ownership of land, rather than
eliminating the stick altogether.66 The Court reasoned that “if the landowner is to
have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be erected,
trees could not be planted, and even fences could not be run.”67 Thus, “[t]he
landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as [they] can occupy
or use in connection with the land.”68
The Court, in providing an example of the erection of an elevated railway over
private property in which none of the supports touch the land, stated this would also
be a taking because it would “subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment of the
property and . . . limit his exploitation of it.”69 The Court not only recognized that the
right to exclusive control of the immediate reaches arises out of its connection to the
ownership of land but also recognized that the economic use of the land depends on
maintaining exclusive control. Thus, the Court redefined property rights by
separating one resource, land, from another, public airspace.
After Causby, the only change to landowners’ property rights was the
redefinition—from ownership of the entire sky above the property to ownership of
the enveloping atmosphere—of a particular right in the bundle of rights attached to
the land.70 Causby did not result in any changes to the legal remedies landowners
have against private actors who interfere with those rights. Drones may lawfully
occupy all airspace apart from the immediate reaches of private land and below 400
feet above ground level (AGL).71 For example, suppose that the definition of
“immediate reaches” is perfectly clear and unambiguous. Drone operators would be
liable under traditional trespass doctrine if the drone crosses into the immediate
reaches. Similarly, drone operators could still be liable under private nuisance laws,
even if the drone never crosses over into the immediate reaches.72
The problem only arises because of the ambiguity of the term, which has its
advantages and disadvantages. The biggest advantage is by far the opportunity to
supplement the Causby holding with more flexible liability rules (as opposed to
redefining property rights) in coordination with a “robust, creative, and multipronged solution” that includes “technological innovation, cultural change and, when

66. By asserting that the ad coelum doctrine had “no place in the modern world” and
upholding Congress’s declaration that the navigable airspace is public airspace—that is, all
airspace at least 500 feet AGL and above—the Court effectively shortened the airspace “stick”
in the “bundle of sticks.” See supra Section I.A.
67. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
70. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. This is a general statement pertaining to
property rights and is premised on an implied assumption that the drone operator is not
violating any other law or regulation, including certain airspace restrictions. See 14 C.F.R. §
107.41 (2019).
72. This assumes there is a cognizable harm that amounts to substantial interference. See
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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appropriate, regulation.”73 The biggest disadvantage is the potential exploitation of
the ambiguity for the creation of inflexible and inefficient property rights.
B. The Aerial Trespass Doctrine Is Economically Indistinguishable from Nuisance
The ULC, citing Professors A. Michael Froomkin and P. Zak Colangelo, argues
that common law aerial trespass “conflat[es]” the strict liability rule of trespass to
land with the rule of nuisance by superimposing the requirement of actual harm.74
The doctrine was created through subsequent courts’ readings of Causby to require
actual interference with the landowner’s “actual use, as distinguished from potential
use or bare possession.”75 The ULC, quoting Froomkin and Colangelo, suggests that
“[t]here is no obvious reason why the interference requirement should be as strict in
a trespass claim. If aerial trespass genuinely is to be treated like terrestrial trespass,
then all that should be required is entrance into that part of the airspace that remains
fully private.”76 This last sentence highlights a flawed underlying assumption in the
ULC’s proposed aerial trespass rules—that aerial trespass should be treated the same
as trespass to land.77
The distinction between traditional trespass to land and nuisance is that “[a]
trespass is an invasion of the interest in the exclusive possession of land,” whereas
“[a] nuisance is an interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of
the land, and does not require interference [w]ith the possession.”78 The ULC’s
proposals rest on the assumption that landowners have, or should have, a possessory
interest in the airspace above their land.79 However, a logical interpretation of the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Causby suggests that the Court’s holding was an attempt
to distinguish between landowners’ exclusive possessory interests in land and the
airspace that is public domain.80 Landowners have a possessory interest in the

73. WhiteFox Def. Techs., Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law Relating
to Drones Act, supra 49, at 1. “For example, innovations in UAS traffic management and
remote ID are critical parts of the effort to integrate drones into the national airspace, as are
regulatory and legislative reform that clarify responsibility for drone operators and protect
reasonable public interests in security and privacy.” Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of
property rights and liability rules, see infra Section III.A.
74. Draft for Drafting Committee Meeting, supra note 7, prefatory note at 3.
75. Pueblo of Sandia ex rel. Chaves v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1974)
(emphasis added); see also Draft for Drafting Committee Meeting, supra note 7, prefatory
note at 4 (quoting excerpt from A. Michael Froomkin & P. Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense
Against Robots and Drones, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1, 28 (2015)).
76. Draft for Drafting Committee Meeting, supra note 7, prefatory note at 4 (quoting
Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 75, at 69).
77. Id. at 2 (“This Act follows as closely as possible the existing precedents which have
traditionally governed trespass to land.”); see also supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. d (1979) (emphasis added).
79. See Draft for Drafting Committee Meeting, supra note 7, § 301 cmt. (emphasis added)
(“The right to exclude others from one’s airspace serves . . . to protect privacy interests of
possessors of land.”) (quoting James C. Smith, supra note 64, at § 5:3).
80. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. The support for the per se rule that the
ULC has included in its draft Tort Law Relating to Drones Act only incorporates specific
language of the Causby holding that supports its argument. When the facts and circumstances
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airspace above their land only to the extent that they can “occupy or use [it] in
connection with the land.”81 Absent a more precise definition of “immediate
reaches,” this possessory interest is indistinguishable from the right to the use and
enjoyment of land. Hence the need to require actual interference with an actual use
of the land.
Moreover, the substantial interference requirement in nuisance cases “operates to
screen out a host of nuisance actions where the costs of the nuisance, if not
necessarily lower than those of abating the nuisance, probably are lower than the sum
of those costs plus the costs of using the legal system.” 82 In the context of drones, the
requirement of substantial interference will screen out legal claims where the cost of
interference to the landowner is less than the cost of abating the nuisance—the
decrease in the net benefit to drone operators through a reduction in the level of drone
activity83—plus the costs of using the legal system.
Additionally, courts have rejected a strict liability approach in favor of a costbenefit approach to traditional land use conflicts. Private nuisance actions require a
showing that the activity was unreasonable, which is “unmistakably [an] economic
analysis of nuisance.”84 The First Restatement of Torts states that “an intentional
invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable . . .
unless the utility of the actor’s conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm.”85 The
Second Restatement of Torts provided an alternative test that would allow the
plaintiff to “show that the cost of abatement, although it might exceed the benefits,
would not drive the defendant out of business.”86 The alternative test offered by the
Second Restatement of Torts is not accepted by most courts and “is inefficient,

surrounding the case are also considered with the entire holding, the Causby opinion cannot
logically be interpreted to support a bright-line per se rule. See supra Section II.A (interpreting
Causby and its implications on property rights). For example, the ULC’s draft quotes Causby
as follows: “The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the
public domain. We need not determine at this time what those precise limits are.” Draft for
Annual Meeting, supra note 6, prefatory note at 1 (emphasis in original). However, the
immediately preceding sentence states that “[t]he airplane is part of the modern environment
of life, and the inconveniences which it causes are normally not compensable under the Fifth
Amendment.” United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946). Moreover, the sentence
immediately following the ULC’s quote states that “[f]lights over private land are not a taking,
unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the
enjoyment and use of the land.” Id. If it would not be compensable under the Fifth Amendment
if the government were doing it, then what obvious reason is there for it to be compensable
under trespass if civilians were doing the very same thing? That is, why shouldn’t we interpret
Causby to mean that the “immediate reaches,” as it pertains to aerial trespass and drones, is
the point at which frequent drone operations over private land would be a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land, thereby requiring actual interference to
establish aerial trespass.
81. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264 (emphasis added).
82. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 49 (1987).
83. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
84. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 49.
85. Id. at 49 n.29 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939)).
86. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 1979)).
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because it amounts to strict liability (subject to the limitation that it not be
crushing).”87 Since the judicially created doctrine of nuisance was developed with
economic considerations in mind, perhaps the judicially created doctrine of aerial
trespass resembles nuisance because it was also created with economic
considerations in mind.88 Subsequent courts’ citations to Causby might reflect
nothing more than a preference to rely upon a Supreme Court decision, which
“requires” them to take economic considerations (substantial interference) into
account, rather than explicitly stating they are engaging in a cost-benefit analysis
equivalent to that of nuisance.89
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AERIAL TRESPASS
The method of analysis used in this Note is based on a positive economic theory
of law—the theory that common law rules can best be explained as if they were
designed to increase economic efficiency.90 The positive economic theory of tort
law—first articulated by Richard A. Posner and William M. Landes in 1987—
suggests that “the common law of torts is best explained as if the judges who created
the law through decisions operating as precedents in later cases were trying to
promote efficient resource allocation.”91 Posner and Landes tested this theory
through an ex post review and analysis of tort cases.92 An ex post positive economic
analysis seeks to explain existing common law rules “by demonstrating how and to
what extent [the] existing doctrines further economic efficiency.”93 In other words,
an ex post positive economic analysis seeks to explain known data.94 This Part seeks
to apply an ex ante positive economic analysis—applying a theory that has been
tested on known data to a new context with limited known data—to predict how and

87. Id. at 49–50 n.29 (citing several sources that support the propositions that the First
Restatement’s test is still the standard and that few cases cite the alternative whereas many
cite the first).
88. See supra Section II.A (arguing that the Causby Court’s redefinition of landowners’
property rights in the airspace above their land was the product of the Court’s recognition that
changes in technology had given rise to a more efficient use of that airspace and the Court’s
desire to compensate a landowner that had suffered a substantial loss).
89. Most would agree the Causby decision has no precedential authority in aerial trespass
cases, only takings cases. See Draft for Annual Meeting, supra note 6, prefatory note at 4
(quoting Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 75, at 69).
90. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 1. For a summarization of the numerous studies
that support this theory, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW pt. II (9th ed.
2014).
91. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 1.
92. Landes and Posner applied their theory to the entire field of tort law by using simple
economic models of alternative liability rules to predict which specific rules of tort law would
be adopted to promote efficiency and comparing those predictions with the actual rules
adopted in a representative sample of tort cases. See id. at 22.
93. Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1233 (1988)
(reviewing LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, and STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW (1987)).
94. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 22.
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to what extent the existing aerial trespass doctrine, and proposed aerial trespass rules,
will further economic efficiency in the context of drones and airspace rights.95
For the purposes of this Note, “economics” is defined as the “science of rational
choice or (equivalently) as the attempt to get the most from scarce resources.”96 An
economic analysis reaches a conclusion as to the efficient allocation of resources
among competing uses by allocating the resources to those members of society who
will “get the most” out of them.97 The economic unit of measurement that economists
seek to maximize to get the most out of a resource is “utility”—happiness, pleasure
or satisfaction that is derived from the use of the resource.98 However, it is impossible
to measure a person’s level of utility and, even if it were possible, one cannot
compare the value of one person’s utility to the utility of another.99 Wealth, on the
other hand, is much easier to quantify by observing an individuals’ relative
willingness and ability to pay for some right(s) to a particular resource, or,
conversely, what they demand in exchange for giving up some right(s) they possess
in that resource.100 Thus, for the purposes of this Note, a policy change is efficient if
it is wealth maximizing, that is, “if the dollar value of the gains to the winners is
greater than the dollar cost of the losses to the losers.”101
A. Property Rights v. Liability Rules
To properly analyze and compare the common law aerial trespass doctrine with
the ULC’s proposed per se aerial trespass rule (and the alternatives), it is necessary
to distinguish between property rules and liability rules as methods for protecting
property rights.102 A property rule creates an “exclusive right to the use, control, and
enjoyment of some resource—that is, a right to exclude anyone else in the world
from using the resource without the consent of the owner of the right . . . .”103 Property
rights give the rights holder the right to exclude, notwithstanding the argument that
“the general welfare, whether defined in economic or in any other terms, would be
increased by transferring the right to someone else.”104 A liability rule does not create

95. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1522 (1998) (stating that a positive economic
analysis of law seeks to explain “what the effects of law will be and why we have the laws we
do”); see also BARNES & STOUT, supra note 61, at 1 (“Applying economic principles to legal
problems brings a better understanding of the implications of legal rules.”).
96. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 23.
97. BARNES & STOUT, supra note 61, at 1–2, 4.
98. Id. at 4, 11.
99. Id. at 9–10.
100. See id. at 10; see also POSNER, supra note 90, at 16 (discussing the economic concept
of “wealth”).
101. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 16.
102. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean,
54 U. CHI. J.L. & ECON. S77, S79 (2011) (citing Guido Calabresi & Douglas A. Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089 (1972)) (stating that Calabresi and Melamed made a “landmark distinction between
property rules and liability rules as modes of protection of property rights”).
103. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 29.
104. Id.
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a right to exclude; instead, it creates only a right to claim damages caused by
another’s activity that damages the resource or otherwise interferes with the rights
holder’s use of that resource.105 Thus, a property rule protects property rights by
requiring the consent of the rights holder to permit the transfer of rights—generally
through a voluntary exchange—whereas a liability rule protects the property rights
by permitting the transfer of rights without the consent of the rights holder,
“conditioned on the payment of government-determined compensation for the rights
taken.”106
The distinction between property and liability rules has two important
implications. First, the reallocation of resources in the property-rights approach
requires a voluntary market transaction; the liability-rule approach allows for the
reallocation of resources through the legal system, bypassing the market.107 Second,
transaction costs play an important role in determining the efficiency of the
applicable legal rules.108 The property approach is economically superior to the
liability approach when the costs of voluntary market transactions are low because
the market is deemed a more efficient mechanism for determining the relative values
each party places on a particular right in a resource.109 In contrast, when transaction
costs are high the property approach is economically inferior to the liability approach
because the costs of effecting a transfer of rights will prevent the reallocation of
resources to their most valuable uses.110 Recognizing these implications, a basic
application of the Coase Theorem—that the efficient reallocation of resources is
independent of the initial assignment of rights, provided that transaction costs are
zero—can be used to reliably predict the relative efficiency of a proposed rule
change.111
B. The Coase Theorem and Transaction Costs
For simplicity, the microeconomic analysis put forth in this Note is based on the
examples, models, and analyses provided by Landes and Posner, whereby they
explain and expand upon the Coase Theorem.112 The context for the analysis in the

105. Id. at 30.
106. Merrill & Smith, supra note 102, at S79.
107. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 31.
108. For a more detailed discussion of transaction costs, see infra Section III.B.2.
109. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 31.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 31 (discussing the predictive implications of the distinction between
property and liability rules and the presence of the distinction in the Coase Theorem); see also
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 U. CHI. J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1960). For a discussion
of the accuracy of simple economic models, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 12.
112. See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 31–53, 62–72. The illustrations
and analysis presented in Section III.B are directly modeled after the examples provided by
Landes and Posner with only minor adjustments in the variables used. See id. at 31–38. Section
III.C expands upon this model by adapting the cost and benefit equations to illustrate the
common law aerial trespass doctrine and incorporating the concepts employed by Landes and
Posner in illustrating their “Model of Liability Rules.” See id. at 62–72. Additionally, the
author has made similar adjustments to adapt the model to illustrate the ULC’s proposed
alternative to the per se rule discussed in Section III.D.1.
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subsequent Sections of this Note is as follows. Suppose the FAA amends all the
necessary provisions of Part 107 to allow unrestricted drone operations for package
delivery.113 Amazon Prime Air114 knows that it may fly its package delivery drones
above 200 feet above ground level (AGL) without risk of liability for trespass or
interfering with the use and enjoyment of private land.115 However, Amazon has
determined that package delivery would be more profitable if its drones operated
below 200 feet AGL because such operations would not only decrease last-mile
shipping costs116 but also open up a new revenue stream from the new, or higher
quality, data the drones can collect along a flight path at a lower altitude.117

113. For simplicity, this Note assumes “unrestricted drone operations” to mean all
operations that the FAA has determined can be safely conducted on a widespread basis, given
the technology available. In other words, the FAA has determined that the commercial use of
drones for package delivery can be safely implemented nationwide.
114. See generally First Prime Air Delivery, AMAZON: AMAZON PRIME AIR,
https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-Air/b?ie=UTF8&node=8037720011 [https://perma
.cc/CL89-337Q].
115. Because the controversy surrounding the ULC’s proposed rules is about drone
operations below (as opposed to above) 200 feet AGL, this Note assumes, for the sake of
simplicity, that no drone operations conducted above 200 feet AGL will result in liability from
the drone operator, Amazon, to the owner of the private land below.
116. Amazon has stated that its drone delivery service will be used primarily for “lastmile” deliveries and for distances no more than fifteen miles and packages under five pounds.
See Zachary Terry, Amazon Prime Air: Drone Delivery and Profits, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 28,
2017, 4:06 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/instablog/3009741-msu-eli-broad-studentresearch/4964322-amazon-prime-air-drone-delivery-profits [https://perma.cc/K46B-YM7V].
Comparing the estimated cost per mile for delivery by drone ($0.05) with the current cost per
mile using the U.S. Postal System ($2), Amazon has the potential to decrease their last mile
shipping costs by 97.5%. Id. In 2017, Amazon made more than five billion deliveries
(including international shipments) to its Prime customers (who get free shipping), costing the
company more than $20 billion in shipping costs. Jeff Desjardins, Amazon and UPS Are
Betting Big on Drone Delivery, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 11, 2018, 10:47 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-and-ups-are-betting-big-on-drone-delivery-2018-3
[https://perma.cc/2HU3-BXFE]. Since 90% of the items Amazon sells weigh less than five
pounds, id., there is a potential to save upwards of $6 billion annually on its last-mile shipping
costs alone. See infra note 130 (Amazon shipped approximately 3.3 billion packages in the
United States in 2017). Analysts estimate that Amazon could save $1.1 billion per year if it
could implement drone delivery on a wide enough scale to no longer need to rely on FedEx or
UPS. Terry, supra note 116. Moreover, Amazon prioritizes capturing market share over profits
and is more likely to transfer most of these savings to its customers. Id.; see also Desjardins,
supra note 116 (stating that 86% of abandoned online checkout carts are due to high shipping
costs).
117. See Matthew Stern, Amazon’s Drones May Collect Valuable Data on Their FlyOvers, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2017, 8:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/retailwire/2017/08
/28/amazons-drones-may-collect-valuable-data-on-their-fly-overs/#539b9caa6cbe
[https://perma.cc/2VBU-LQ6R] (“Amazon has patented technology that allows a drone to
scan and collect data from houses it passes on its flight path.”). For simplicity, this Note
assumes that the data Amazon plans to collect with its drones either cannot be collected at an
altitude above 200 feet or that flying below 200 feet would increase the quality or type of data
the drone can collect, resulting in increased revenue. Furthermore, the privacy implications
regarding data collection are beyond the scope of this Note.
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Depending on the applicable laws—in addition to aerial trespass, nuisance, and
other laws that may put Amazon at risk of liability—Amazon may choose to either
(1) conduct a certain quantity (Q) of drone operations below 200 feet AGL,118 or (2)
refrain from all drone operations below 200 feet AGL and invest in its next best
alternative activity. The net benefit (NB) Amazon receives for Q drone operations
represents its economic profits (as opposed to accounting profits)—the amount that
Amazon’s revenues and cost savings exceeds its opportunity costs. The opportunity
costs of an activity include both the costs of the resources used to generate revenue
(e.g., labor and capital)—accounting profit is the amount of revenue that exceeds
such costs—and the profits that could have been made by employing those resources
to their next best alternative use.119 Thus, Amazon’s net benefit is a function of Q
drone operations (NB(Q) in Table 1 below), meaning the economic profits depend
on the quantity of drone operations below 200 feet AGL. The marginal net benefit
(MNBQ) is the incremental net benefit Amazon receives from one drone operation.120
Economics assumes that the marginal net benefits are initially positive but declining
(the first drone operation is more profitable than the second and so on121), and that
they become zero at some point and negative thereafter.122 Notice that Amazon’s net
benefit will be maximized at four drone operations, when the marginal net benefit
for doing any additional operations is zero.
Now suppose that Amazon’s use of airspace below 200 feet AGL is incompatible
with the landowner’s use of that airspace because it interferes with the landowner’s

118. While the analysis put forth in this Note expresses Q as discrete whole numbers, the
quantity of drone operations is assumed to include all possible dimensions of drone operations
below 200 feet AGL such as the altitude (or extent below 200 feet), the number of drone flights
below 200 feet, and the amount of time a drone (individually or in aggregate) is above the
landowner’s property.
119. See POSNER, supra note 90, at 6. For Amazon’s drone delivery service, the costs of
labor and capital might include the cost of the drones (including repair and maintenance),
research and development of drone technology, and the labor needed to maintain and operate
the drones. The next best alternative might be investing that capital in other delivery vehicles,
such as delivery trucks (or electric delivery trucks) and hiring drivers/operators for those
vehicles.
120. The equations used for net benefit and marginal net benefit are NB(Q) = 4Q – 1 2 Q2
and MNBQ = 4 – Q. These equations are chosen for simplicity and are the equations used by
Landes and Posner. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 31.
121. Although the law of diminishing returns, see infra note 122, is generally true for most
activities, this may not be the case for Amazon due to network effects. Tech companies like
Amazon, Google, and Facebook collect data from their customers/users that they use for
marketing, customer service, and targeted advertising (as well as a host of other potential
revenue-generating uses made possible by artificial intelligence). Thus, the more data that can
be collected, the more valuable the data becomes. See Irving Wladawsky-Berger, The Rise of
the Data Economy Is Triggering More Powerful Network Effects, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2017,
11:34 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2017/05/26/the-rise-of-the-data-economy-is-triggering
-more-powerful-network-effects/ [https://perma.cc/Z86Q-8AAY].
122. For an overview of the law of diminishing returns, see generally Paul M. Johns, A
Glossary of Political Economy Terms, Diminishing Returns, Law of, AUBURN UNIV. (1994–
2005), http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/diminishing_returns_law_of [https://perma.cc
/VS9D-FZSS].
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use and enjoyment of land.123 Such interference—whether it be noise, invasion of
privacy, or any other reason124—results in a cost to the landowner of C(Q) and a
marginal cost of MCQ.125 Table 1 below illustrates the net and marginal net benefits
to Amazon and the cost and marginal cost to the landowner of Q drone operations.
Table 1
Q

NB(Q)

MNBQ

C(Q)

MCQ

W(Q)

1
2
3
4
5
6

$3.50
$6.00
$7.50
$8.00
$7.50
$6.00

$3.00
$2.00
$1.00
$0.00
($1.00)
($2.00)

$0.50
$2.00
$4.50
$8.00
$12.50
$18.00

$1.00
$2.00
$3.00
$4.00
$5.00
$6.00

$3.00
$4.00
$3.00
$0.00
($5.00)
($12.00)

1. Conflicting Uses: Coase Theorem Illustrated in the Context of Drones
In determining how and to what extent a law furthers the efficient allocation of
resources, it is important to address the following questions separately. First, whether
a law results in the economically efficient allocation of resources necessarily depends
on the quantity of a given activity that results in the optimal use of that resource. That
is, what is the optimal quantity of drone operations that maximizes society’s net
wealth? The answer can be derived from an application of the Coase Theorem.126
Second, whether the economically optimal use of a resource will result depends on
who bears the costs of the decision to use that resource.127 The answer to these
questions will determine whether property or liability rules (or some combination)
are needed. This Section will answer the first question by showing the optimal
quantity is not zero. Section III.C will determine the efficiency of the aerial trespass
doctrine and the ULC’s proposed rules by measuring the extent that the cost of
interference to landowners is internalized to drone operators.

123. For a discussion about incompatible uses and the Coase Theorem, see generally
POSNER, supra note 90, at 50, § 3.5. The problem of conflicting uses (or incompatible uses)
arises when one party’s use of a resource interferes with another’s use of the same or different
resource, provided both uses are allowed given the parties’ respective property rights. See
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 77–78 (2004) (discussing
the notion of external effects on the use of property).
124. Although issues surrounding privacy are beyond the scope of this Note, this Note
assumes that drone operations below 200 feet AGL impose at least some costs to landowners’
privacy.
125. The equations used for cost and marginal cost (C(Q) = 1 2 Q2 and MCQ = Q) are the
equations use by LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 32.
126. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
127. See Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL.
W. L. REV. 239, 260 (1992) (noting the importance of not confusing “the questions of who
shall make the decisions on how property shall be used, and what those uses shall be, with the
entirely separate question of who shall bear the costs of those decisions”).
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Now, consider the situation where both Amazon and the private land the drone is
operating over have a single owner, Jeff Bezos. Although Bezos will benefit from
Amazon’s drone operations, the trade-off for this benefit is the cost of the
interference with the use and enjoyment of his land. As a rational decision-maker,
Bezos is incentivized to maximize his overall net wealth (W(Q) in Table 1 above).
Bezos’s wealth maximization formula is W(Q) = NB(Q) – C(Q) because Bezos’s
opportunity cost of conducting Q drone operations is increased by the cost of
interference with the use and enjoyment of his land, thereby decreasing the benefit
he receives after taking these costs into account. Table 1 shows that Bezos’s net
wealth is maximized when the quantity of drone operations is two, even though four
drone operations maximizes Amazon’s net benefit. This is the optimal quantity—
where the marginal net benefit to Amazon is equal to the marginal cost of
interference to Bezos—because additional drone operations will result in an
incremental net benefit that is less than the incremental cost of interference.
The microeconomic principles in this example can be aggregated to the
macroeconomic level128 by using Amazon and Jeff Bezos as proxies for society as a
whole; that is, using Amazon as a proxy for all commercial drone operations129 and
Jeff Bezos as a proxy for all private landowners. Thus, the optimal quantity of drone
operations reflects the optimal quantity that maximizes the net wealth of society. But
rather than two drone operations across a single tract of private land, think two
million drone operations across N tracts of land per week or per day.130
Up to this point, no value has been placed on Bezos’s use and enjoyment of his
privately owned land. Yet, the optimal quantity of drone operations is still two,
regardless of the objective or subjective value of Bezos’s use and enjoyment of his
land.131 This is true because the analysis is only concerned with the impact (the costs)

128. While micro- and macroeconomics differ in many respects, the primary difference is
that microeconomics is grounded in core principles used among all economists, whereas
economists in the macroeconomic field disagree on how to apply these core principles to a
national or global level. See G. Chris Rodrigo, Micro and Macro: The Economic Divide, INT’L
MONETARY
FUND,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/bigsmall.htm
[https://perma.cc/HM23-G3WX] (last updated Dec. 18, 2018) (stating that many
macroeconomic models are grounded in microeconomic principles).
129. For information on the current commercial uses of drones, see FORECASTS &
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS DIV., FAA, FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2018-2038
(2018), https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/media/fy2018-38_f
aa_aerospace_forecast.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK3S-7GEC]. For potential uses, see generally
Rohit Jaggi, Air Taxis Could Be the Next Big Thing in Aviation, BARRON’S (July 20, 2018,
12:49 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/air-taxis-could-be-the-next-big-thing-in-avia
tion-1532105388 [https://perma.cc/CR32-XNQL]; Marcontell & Douglas, supra note 3; see
also Cohn, et al., supra note 2, at Exhibit 3 (illustrating potential drone applications).
130. For context, Amazon shipped approximately 3.3 billion packages in the U.S. in 2017
(approximately 9 million per day). See An Amazon Puzzle: How Many Parcels Does It Ship,
How Much Does It Cost, and Who Delivers What Share?, SAVE THE POST OFFICE (July 29,
2019), https://savethepostoffice.com/an-amazon-puzzle-how-many-parcels-does-it-ship-how
-much-does-it-cost-and-who-delivers-what-share/ [https://perma.cc/DMR7-ZNEW].
131. This is true only if we assume the use and enjoyment of land cannot be negative. That
is, the damage to land in general cannot be more than the land is worth (otherwise, a rational
landowner would abandon the land—i.e., move). This differs from the example illustrated by
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of the drone operations on Bezos’s right to the use and enjoyment of his land. To
illustrate this point, suppose Bezos values this right at $10. Notice this is higher than
the value Amazon would place on the right to freely conduct drone operations
without any liability. Absent liability, for trespass or otherwise, Amazon’s net benefit
is maximized at four drone operations, resulting in a net benefit of $8. Conducting
any more drone operations would be inefficient from Amazon’s perspective because
the opportunity cost exceeds the incremental benefit Amazon would receive,
meaning Amazon would be better off employing its resources in another activity that
generates a greater net benefit.132
At two drone operations, if Jeff Bezos owns both Amazon and the affected land,
Bezos’s net wealth is $14 ($6 in Amazon profits plus $10 of use and enjoyment of
the land minus $2 for the interference caused by the drones).133 If Amazon is forced
to shut down its drone operations, Bezos’s wealth falls to $10 134—the value he places
on the use and enjoyment of the land.135 If Bezos is forced to move to allow Amazon
to conduct four drone operations, Amazon’s profits would rise to $8, but it would
cost Bezos $10 in the use and enjoyment of his land.136 On the other hand, suppose
that Bezos only valued the use and enjoyment of his land at $3. Bezos’s net wealth
would still be maximized at $7, if Amazon conducted two drone operations ($6 in
Amazon profits, plus $3 of use and enjoyment of the land, minus $2 for the
interference caused by the drones).137 The next best quantity, four drone operations,
results in a net wealth of $5 ($8 in Amazon profits less $3 in use and enjoyment of
land).
Prior to Coase, the prevailing economic thought would have been that unless
Amazon and the private tract of land were under common ownership, giving Amazon
the right to fly drones over private property without any liability for interference with
the use and enjoyment of land below would generate an externality 138—shown as the
deadweight loss (DWL) to society in Figure 1 below.

Landes and Posner where the conflicting uses are both commercial, and thus, the damage can
be greater than the profits earned. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 33–34.
132. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
133. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 33 (using the combination of two
commercial enterprises, farmland, and an adjacent railroad that causes damage to the farmer’s
crops when the rail cars emit sparks as they pass by to illustrate the concept: “At two trains
per day the combined enterprise earns $14 in profits ($6 in railroad profits minus $2 in crop
damages plus $10 in farm profits) . . .”).
134. See id.
135. This assumes, for simplicity, that either Jeff values the use and enjoyment of his new
home $10 less or that moving costs are $10.
136. See supra note 133.
137. See id.; see also supra Table 1 (illustrating that net wealth, W(Q) is maximized at two
drone operations).
138. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 33.
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Figure 1

Coase, however, showed that if transaction costs are zero, Amazon would conduct
only two drone operations even if Amazon had the right to conduct as many as it
wanted, thereby achieving economic equilibrium.139 Although Amazon would intend
to conduct four drone operations, the landowner would offer up to $6 for Amazon to
reduce that number to two (the difference in the cost of interference of $8 for four
operations and $2 for two operations).140 Amazon would accept any offer $2 and
above because $2 is Amazon’s marginal net benefit at two operations—the exact
value of the net benefit Amazon would receive in excess of its next best alternative
activity. This transaction would occur as long as the landowner’s willingness to pay
(WTP) is greater than Amazon’s willingness to accept (WTA),141 provided the costs
of reaching the agreement are zero.142 If the landowner’s WTP is less than $2,
meaning the landowner places a value of less than $2 on the use and enjoyment of
the land, Amazon would reject any offer made by the landowner and choose to
conduct four drone operations.143 Alternatively, if the landowner has an exclusive

139. See id.
140. Provided the landowner values the right to use and enjoyment of property at more
than $8. See supra Table 1.
141. For an overview of the concept of willingness to pay and accept, see B ARNES & STOUT,
supra note 61, at 9–10.
142. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 33.
143. Alternatively, if the landowner is using the land for a profitable activity, the
landowner would not even make the offer because the net profit would still be negative. See
id. at 35. Table 1 suggests that Amazon would accept $0.50 or more to reduce its operations
from four to three, but the landowner would not make the offer because four drone operations
causes the same amount of interference as three and two since all the landowner’s value is
destroyed at just two drone operations. The presence of this external cost to the landowner is
not evidence of inefficiency. Rather, the fact that it remains suggests that it was not worth
internalizing, otherwise the parties would transact to maximize net wealth. Henry E. Smith,
Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S453, S462–S463 (2002) (citing Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 347 (1967)).
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property right to all airspace below 200 feet AGL, the landowner would sell Amazon
an air easement and the parties would negotiate until they agreed upon an easement
for two drone operations at a price between $2 and $6, resulting in the maximum net
wealth of $14.144
While transaction costs are never zero in the real world, the application of the
Coase Theorem shows that property rights are economically preferable to liability
rules whenever transaction costs are lower than the gains from transacting.145
Because market valuations are generally more accurate than the legal system, it is
presumed that property rights are cheaper to administer than liability rules.146 If
transaction costs are so high as to preclude a market solution, property rights will be
sufficient if, and only if, the optimal level of harm caused by an activity is zero or
the optimal solution is no limitation of that activity at all.147 In the first case, the
landowner can be given a property right against any and all interference by drones;
in the second, Amazon can be given the property right to conduct as many drone
operations as it wishes and at whatever altitude it chooses.148
Even if the optimal level of interference is zero at first, such an assignment of
property rights would be objectionable as being too inflexible if the optimal level
becomes positive because changes in technology increase the value of low-altitude
airspace.149 A more flexible alternative would be to require the active party, Amazon,
to compensate the passive party, the landowner, through a liability rule.150 The
difference is that the law is more reluctant to redefine property rights than to modify
liability rules as technology changes.151 “Property rights, being designed as they are
for settings of low transaction costs, are not supposed to be casually redefined by
courts; they are meant to be traded in the market.”152 If transaction costs are
prohibitively high and the optimal solution to a problem of conflicting uses requires
some but not total restriction of the active party’s use, a more flexible regime of
liability rules is preferable to the strict liability of a property rights regime.153
In the context of drones, this Section has demonstrated that the optimal quantity
of drone activity below 200 feet AGL is not zero. Thus, if transaction costs are high,
the problem of conflicting uses between commercial drone operators and private
landowners requires some, but not total, restriction of the use of this low-altitude
airspace by drones. The next Section will argue that transaction costs are
prohibitively high.

144. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 33–34 (stating that both parties would be
better off by reducing the activity because their net wealth is increased by $4, and thus, they
would agree to the reduction).
145. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 36.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. The second assumes Amazon is not violating any other law or regulation. See
supra note 71.
149. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 36 (“It may be that at first the optimal level
of damage is zero but that with changes in technology the optimal level becomes positive.”).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 37.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 36–38.
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2. Transaction Costs
The Coase Theorem can be restated to say that the problem of conflicting uses
will be resolved through a mutually beneficial agreement whenever one exists, given
the assumption that nothing will prevent the parties from reaching it.154 A mutually
beneficial agreement exists whenever the sum of the parties’ utilities (or wealth) can
be raised by an agreement to change the allocation of the parties’ respective rights in
a resource.155 That is, the agreement increases the net wealth of the parties, and thus,
the change is efficient.156
Transaction costs are “any hindrances to bargaining—whether literally [the] costs
of bargaining, or . . . other obstacles.”157 This Section will briefly discuss some
factors that suggest transaction costs are high, preventing commercial drone
operators and landowners from reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. The three
primary factors that explain why transaction costs are prohibitively high in any given
setting are the proximity of the parties, the asymmetries of information between the
bargaining parties, and the number of parties involved.158
Sticking with Amazon as an example, the most obvious obstacle to bargaining
with landowners to purchase air easements is the proximity of the parties. “If the
concerned parties are not physically proximate, bargaining may be difficult to
arrange.”159 If Amazon hopes to implement its drone delivery service all over the
country, Amazon would have to give the local drone operator or manager the
authority to bargain with each of the individual landowners, which would likely
require hiring another highly paid manager for each geographic region that offers
drone delivery.160
Even if this is not enough to prevent bargaining from occurring, the probability
of bargaining failure is likely high due to asymmetric information.161 The probability
is likely high because Amazon does not have sufficient information to objectively
calculate the subjective value the landowner places on the use and enjoyment of the
land or how Amazon’s use of drones might affect that value.162 On the other side, the
landowner may think Amazon’s willingness to pay is much higher than it really is
and reject an otherwise mutually beneficial offer.163

154. SHAVELL, supra note 123, at 83–84.
155. Id. at 84.
156. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
157. SHAVELL, supra note 123, at 84 n.8.
158. See id. at 87–88.
159. Id. at 88.
160. According to Glassdoor, the average total pay for an Amazon Area Manager is
$62,949. See Amazon Area Manager Salaries, GLASSDOOR, https://www.glassdoor.com
/Salary/Amazon-Area-Manager-Salaries-E6036_D_KO7,19.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZS7BRW5Y] (updated Feb. 4, 2020).
161. See generally SHAVELL, supra note 123, at 89–90 (stating that the explanation for
bargaining failure “involves asymmetric information between parties that leads to
miscalculations in bargaining and failure to agree”).
162. See id. at 89–91.
163. See id. at 90–91 (stating that a rejection of such an offer would be rational due to
asymmetric information); see also POSNER, supra note 90, at 19 (discussing the “endowment
effect”—we value what we have more than we would value the identical thing if we did not
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The number of parties involved in the transaction is probably the most significant
factor because transaction costs “tend to rise steeply as the number of parties to [the]
transaction increases.”164 Nuisance cases commonly arise from settings of high
transaction costs because the nuisance affects a number of surrounding parties.165 For
Amazon, this is potentially a significant obstacle because the number of homes or
businesses that a drone might fly over to deliver a single package is likely to be
dozens or even hundreds, even if Amazon limits its drone delivery service to a
fifteen-mile radius of each facility it operates the drones out of.166 Amazon may only
choose to implement drone delivery in a particular location if it can get a certain
number of landowners to sell an air easement, with each agreement with an
individual landowner conditioned on an agreement being reached with all
landowners in the area. If one landowner holds out or refuses to sell an air easement,
even if Amazon values it more, then Amazon may not be able to offer its drone
delivery service at all in that location.167 Furthermore, the holdout problem should
not be dismissed simply because current regulations168 and technological capabilities
of drones limit the number of landowners operators would have to negotiate with.169
State legislatures should be mindful of the more permissive regulations and
technological innovations to come that will allow drones to travel greater distances
in the future.170 More flexible liability rules may be a better alternative to prematurely
drawing an inflexible line in the sky.171

own it but was offered to us for sale).
164. POSNER, supra note 90, at 52. “[T]he formula for the number of links required to join
all members of a set of n members is suggestive: n(n-1) / 2.” Id. For example, if a transaction
is conditioned on the agreement between three parties, then each party has to coordinate with
the other two, requiring three different links in the negotiation. But if there are four parties,
then six different links are required.
165. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 43 (“[T]ransaction costs are likely to be high
because of the number of properties affected.”).
166. See supra note 116.
167. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L.
REV. 965 (2004) (discussing the holdout problem and transaction costs in nuisance law as
reasons for potentially favoring liability rules over property rights).
168. Most notably, current FAA regulations require drone operators to maintain visual line
of sight with their drones. 14 C.F.R. § 107.51(b) (2016).
169. Professor Troy Rule, in arguing that transaction costs are not prohibitive, dismissed
the potential holdout problems, stating that the number of landowners affected by a single
drone operation is likely low because “drones are not designed to travel even a single mile
away from their operators.” Rule, supra note 19, at 195–96.
170. Section 370 of the FAA Modernization Act of 2018 suggests Congress wants the FAA
to amend Part 107 to allow for operations beyond visual line of sight and over people sooner
rather than later. See Haye Kesteloo, H.R. 302, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 Passed
by Senate Today, DRONEDJ (Oct. 3, 2018), https://dronedj.com/2018/10/03/senate-faareauthorization-act-2018/ [https://perma.cc/XGC3-ESJ2]; see also supra note 129.
171. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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C. Common Law Aerial Trespass v. Per Se Aerial Trespass
The previous Section illustrated that, under the Coase Theorem, the optimal
quantity (Q) of drone activity under 200 feet AGL is not zero and provided arguments
for why transactions costs are likely prohibitively high, and therefore the efficient
allocation of low altitude airspace is not likely achievable through the assignment of
property rights and traditional market forces. The remainder of this Part addresses
whether one of the ULC’s proposed rules is more efficient than common law aerial
trespass, and thus preferable to the common law doctrine despite the resulting
inefficiencies. The following Sections expand upon the examples discussed in the
previous Section to illustrate that the ULC’s proposed rules are less efficient than the
common law aerial trespass doctrine.
1. Economic Analysis of a Per Se Aerial Trespass Rule
The ULC’s proposed per se aerial trespass rule is just as economically inefficient
as giving commercial drones the right-of-way to fly at any altitude above private
property without subjecting them, or their operators, to any liability for harm caused
to the private landowner.172 This is true when the economic model is concerned only
with the use of the airspace below 200 feet AGL.173 An expanded model, which
considers the use of airspace between 200 and 400 feet AGL, requires additional
assumptions that cannot be defended with the information available, resulting in a
less accurate model with little predictive value.174
The per se rule is equivalent to giving landowners property rights to use the
airspace below 200 feet above the surface of their land.175 The analysis in Section
III.B.1 showed that if transaction costs are high, giving Amazon the right to conduct
unrestricted drone operations over the landowner’s private property, without the
threat of liability, would generate a DWL of $4—illustrated in Figure 1.176 The same
result would occur if the landowner is given the right to exclude Amazon and a
voluntary market exchange is infeasible due to high transaction costs. Table 1

172. See supra note 138 and accompanying text; see supra Figure 1.
173. For simplicity, this analysis treats the proposed rule as placing a ceiling on land at 200
feet AGL and ignores the provision prohibiting drones from coming within 200 feet of
structures. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
174. Under an expanded model, if you assume that Amazon’s NB(Q) and MNBQ in Table
1 reflect the value Amazon places on its use of all airspace below 400 feet AGL, creating a
line at 200 feet that is per se aerial trespass will substantially impact Amazon’s net benefit
function, making package delivery only marginally better than Amazon’s next best use.
Amazon’s new net and marginal net benefit, NB(Q)’ and MNBQ’ can be illustrated using
NB(Q) = 2Q – 1 2 Q2, where MNBQ = -Q + 2, and if the landowner is given the right to exclude
Amazon below 200 feet AGL, the cost of interference is reduced significantly (C(Q)’ =
1 Q2, where MCQ’ = 𝑄 ), resulting in DWL of $3. But if instead the assumption is that
4
2
Amazon’s NB(Q) and the landowner’s C(Q) directly correlate with the size of the “drone
highway” (Q of 4 would be 0 to 400 feet AGL and Q of 2 would be 200 to 400 feet AGL),
then drawing a “bright-line” at 200 feet would be perfectly efficient with a DWL of $0.
Unfortunately, neither assumption can be justified due to a dearth of relevant data.
175. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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showed that Amazon’s willingness to pay for an air easement that allows two drone
operations was $6 (Amazon’s net benefit for two drone operations) and the
landowner’s willingness to accept was $2 (the cost of interference of two drone
operations). If transaction costs—the costs of finding each other, valuing the air
easement, and negotiating the terms and price177—are greater than $4, then the
transaction will not occur. The result is a DWL of $4, which is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Figure 1

2.

Figure 2

Economic Analysis of Common Law Aerial Trespass

This Note will focus on the common law doctrine’s requirement of substantial
interference and ignore the “fact-specific inquiries into what constitutes the
‘immediate reaches’ of the airspace above the plaintiff’s parcel.”178 This is the
dispositive element and an argument can be made that the facts needed to show
substantial interference are the same for the “immediate reaches” element.179 The
exact point at which a drone’s flight path crosses over to the immediate reaches is
not within the scope of this Note; it is sufficient to assume that such point is where
the drone activity results in interference with the actual use and enjoyment of the
private land and property below.180 For simplicity, the analysis will treat aerial

177. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
178. Draft for Drafting Committee Meeting, supra note 6, at 4 (quoting Rule, supra note
19, at 184).
179. The argument would be that, absent a clear definition of “immediate reaches,” a drone
will not be found to have entered the immediate reaches unless it causes substantial
interference. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
180. This assumption works because even if we were able to parcel out mutually exclusive
rights to the use of airspace—such as drawing a line at X feet AGL—“[t]ruly exclusive
(absolute, unqualified) property rights would be a contradiction in terms.” P OSNER, supra note
90, at 50. Posner illustrates this contradiction in his discussion of incompatible uses of two
adjacent but separate parcels of property—a farmer’s use of land to plant crops and a railroad
that emits sparks that cross over to the farmer’s land and damage the crops. Id. “To enjoy
[absolute and unqualified] exclusive use of its right-of-way, a railroad must be permitted to
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trespass similar to nuisance and, accordingly, the model will incorporate the
probability of harm occurring, which includes the likelihood an interference will not
be litigated or will go uncompensated.181
Suppose that for all drone activity Amazon conducts below 200 feet AGL
Amazon’s net benefit and the landowner’s cost of interference are the same as in
Table 1 (NB(Q), MNBQ, C(Q) in Table 2 below),182 when Amazon’s drone operations
are unrestricted (no liability). Under the common law doctrine, Amazon could
potentially be liable for any interference caused by its drones if they fly too low
(within the immediate reaches of the land below), are unreasonably loud, hover too
long, drop too frequently to a low altitude, or are otherwise operated in a way that
unreasonably interferes with the landowner’s use and enjoyment of land.
Table 2
Q

NB(Q)

MNBQ

NBA

MNBA

C(Q)

E(D)

W(Q)

1

3.50

3

$3.45

$2.85

$0.50

$0.05

$3.00

2

6.00

2

$5.60

$1.40

$2.00

$0.40

$4.00

2.815

7.30

1.185

$6.18

($0.00)

$3.96

$1.12

$3.34

3

7.50

1

$6.15

($0.35)

$4.50

$1.35

$3.00

4

8.00

0

$4.80

($2.40)

$8.00

$3.20

$0.00

At Q = 4 Amazon operates in a way that provides the greatest net benefit without
taking into consideration how the drone operations affect the landowner’s use and
enjoyment of land below; Amazon is assumed to be operating carelessly. Assume
that at Q = 4 Amazon has a 40% chance of being successfully sued by the landowner
and having to pay $8. Thus, the amount of damages Amazon is expected to pay,
E(D), is $3.20 (40% of $8). If Amazon exercises some care by altering the way it
conducts its drone operations and/or reducing the amount of operation conducted
(from Q = 4 to Q = 3),183 the probability that Amazon will face a successful lawsuit
is reduced to 30%, and thus, Amazon would have a 30% chance of having to pay

emit engine sparks without legal limitation; the value of the [right-of-way] would be impaired
otherwise. But the value of adjacent farmland would be reduced because of the fire hazard
from the sparks.” Id.
181. The actual probability of litigation or compensation does not impact the efficiency of
the rule. See infra note 185. Additionally, the model is based on Landes and Posner’s model
for liability rules where nuisance is considered the equivalent of negligence. See LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 82, at 39 (stating that a negligence rule is “essentially equivalent” to a
reasonable-use nuisance rule); see also Smith, supra note 167, at 969 (“[I]f there is one thing
upon which commentators seem to agree, it is that the standard for nuisance law should be
assimilated to that of accident law.”).
182. See supra notes 120–125 and accompanying text.
183. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 66 (stating that the injuring party “is
interested in any measure that would reduce his expected damage by more than the cost of the
measure; it is a matter of indifference to him whether the cost results from purchasing some
safety input or from forgoing the profits from a higher level of productive activity”).
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$4.50. Amazon’s net benefit, however, would be reduced to $7.50 because either the
altered drone operations cost more to perform (otherwise Amazon would be not
doing it this way in the first place) or Amazon chooses to reduce the labor and capital
invested in this activity because the expected cost of four drone operations is $1.85
more than three drone operations ($3.20 versus $1.35), which is greater than the
marginal net benefit Amazon would receive from the additional operation. Similarly,
as Amazon increases its level of care or reduces its drone activity to Q = 2 and Q =
1, assume the probability of facing a successful lawsuit decreases to 20% and 10%,
respectively.
The common law aerial trespass doctrine forces Amazon to internalize the
expected damages. Amazon’s net benefit after internalizing these costs is expressed
as NBA = NB(Q) – E(D).184 Amazon will still continue to conduct drone operations
until its MNBA is zero, which is at Q = 2.815 in Table 2.185 The result, illustrated in
Figure 3, is a DWL of $0.66.186 Amazon’s net benefit after paying expected damages
is $6.18. The landowner will be compensated for the expected damages of $1.12,
resulting in $2.85 going uncompensated.187 Thus, net wealth is increased by $3.34,
whereas the maximum increase in net wealth that can be achieved is $4.

184. For a more detailed discussion on how to incorporate probabilities and expected
damages in an economic model for liability rules, see generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note
82, at 55–73. The full equation used in the model is NBA = 4Q – 1 2 Q2 – (0.1)(Q) 1 2 Q2,
where MNBA = 4 – Q – (0.15)Q2. The author has altered the equation used by Landes and
Posner to reflect Amazon’s expected net benefit, NBA, which is the net benefit derived from Q
drone operations less expected damages. See generally id. at 62–68.
185. Depending on the percentages that are attached to each level of activity, Q will either
be closer to 2 or closer to 3 but will always be within this range when the probability at Q = 3
is greater than 22.5%. The maximum DWL possible, subject to this limitation, is $1.00 ($7.50
– $4.50). To illustrate the impact of percentages, assigning 3% to Q = 3 would result in a level
of activity at 3.785 (with a respective 3.785% probability) and a DWL of $3.19.
186. Calculating net wealth from the numbers in the table will result in a DWL of $0.67
due to rounding.
187. The fact that some interference may still go uncompensated is not a sign of
inefficiency but a “potential externality” that is not worth internalizing because the cost of
internalizing—identifying and pursuing legal action against the drone operator—may be
greater than the harm caused by the interference. See supra note 143.
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Figure 3

Under the simple microeconomic analysis in this Section, the common law aerial
trespass doctrine (DWL of $0.66) is clearly economically superior to the ULC’s per
se aerial trespass doctrine (DWL of $4). This, of course, assumes that Amazon
derives a significant net benefit from being able to conduct its drone operations below
200 feet AGL, as opposed to being strictly limited to the airspace between 200 feet
and 400 feet AGL.188 Moreover, “[t]he nuisance standard illustrates the common
law’s awareness that when the place, kind, or amount of activity is an important
factor in bringing about the right level of damage, it should be part of the legal
standard.”189 The alternative aerial trespass rules the ULC’s drafting committee has
proposed even incorporate these factors into the language of the rules, suggesting the
committee at least acknowledges that its per se rule may be too inflexible to
adequately accommodate beneficial and productive uses of commercial drones.190
D. Economic Analysis of Proposed Alternatives to Per Se Aerial Trespass
On October 19, 2018, the drafting committee, in response to the negative reactions
from the drone community, released a revised draft of its Tort Law Relating to
Drones Act, offering two alternatives to the per se rule.191 The first alternative
replaces the per se trespass rule with a rebuttable presumption—that a person who
operates drones over private land below 200 feet AGL is presumed to have

188. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of relevant information that is needed to determine if
this assumption is correct. For evidence that Amazon may indeed derive additional benefits,
see supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text.
189. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 70.
190. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
191. See generally Draft for Drafting Committee Meeting, supra note 7; Oct. 19, 2018
Memo, supra note 7, at 2 (“Comments from observers just before and soon after the Annual
Meeting indicated unease and dissatisfaction with the per se trespass concept and encouraged
the development of alternatives to the initial approach.”) (emphasis in original).
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committed a trespass to land—that “may be rebutted by a showing that the intrusion
did not significantly intrude upon the landowner’s enjoyment or use of her
property.”192 The rule then provides an inclusive list of nine factors for courts to
consider to determine the significance of the intrusion—such as the amount of time
the drone is over the land, the height at which it was operated, and the noise produced
by the drone (“in the context of any other noise nearby”).193 The rationale for this
alternative is that “while it provides less certainty than the per se trespass rule, it also
provides more flexibility for drone operators across a host of circumstances,”
potentially allowing “more use of the airspace above land, while still protecting
landowner rights from interference.”194 Additionally, it may incentivize the
development of “innovative uses that do not affect the use and enjoyment of the land
below.”195
The second alternative leaves it to each state to recognize “a right of landowners
in the airspace appurtenant to their land extending to various heights depending
primarily upon the use and location of the land. . . .”196 Specifically, it requires each
state to adopt a uniform law with respect to rural, suburban, urban, and agricultural
regions, as defined by the relevant state law.197 The provision states that the rule does
“not create any new rights to landowners, but rather recognize[s] the common law
and statutory rights already held by landowners.”198 Furthermore, the committee
reasons that although this alternative would not provide a uniform height across the
nation, the uniformity comes from “the requirement that the state explicitly articulate
the height” under which a drone operator is liable for trespass, thereby removing all
uncertainty by giving the drone community the information it needs to “develop
appropriate maps and technologies to allow for drone operation within the
boundaries established by each state.”199
1.

Rebuttable Presumption of Trespass to Land

Both proposed alternatives would only be marginally more efficient than the per
se aerial trespass rule and both would still be inferior to the common law aerial
trespass doctrine. For the first alternative, the probabilities in the simple economic
model used for the common law doctrine can be adjusted to reflect the probability
that the presumption will be rebutted. Assume the quantity of drone operations, Q,
reflects the overall activity level of the drone operations, not just the number of
overflights, including the factors suggested by the rule for determining significance
of the intrusion—such as the amount of time the drone is over the land, the height at

192. Draft for Drafting Committee Meeting, supra note 7, § 301(c) (Alternative A).
193. Id.; see also Oct. 19, 2018 Memo, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing illustrative factors).
194. Oct. 19, 2018 Memo, supra note 7, at 2 (emphasis omitted).
195. Id. at 2.
196. Draft for Drafting Committee Meeting, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1) (Alternative B).
197. Id. § 301(a)(2)–(5).
198. Id. § 301(a)(6). The drafting committee cites to a regulatory takings case, Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), stating that it “stands for the proposition
that property rights include airspace rights, and that airspace rights are a part of the rights that
landowners hold in their land.” Oct. 19, 2018 Memo, supra note 7, at 4.
199. Oct. 19, 2018 Memo, supra note 7, at 3.
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which it was operated, and the noise created.200 Furthermore, assume Q = 4
represents a level of activity that will almost certainly result in liability, yielding a
100% probability that Amazon will face a successful lawsuit by the landowner and
pay $8 in damages. Additionally, assume that reducing Q from four to three increases
the chance that Amazon would be able to rebut the trespass presumption, thereby
reducing the likelihood of liability from 100% to 75% with expected damages of
$3.38 ($4.50 of 75%). Similarly, assume that the respective probabilities for Q = 2
and Q = 1 are 50% and 25%, respectively.
However, the rule is still an action for trespass and does not convey the right to
operate drones below 200 feet above private property so long as the drone does not
cause interference. The landowner presumably still has the right to exclude all drones
up to 200 feet AGL, and thus, Amazon will likely be limited to operations closer to
the 200-foot AGL line,201 substantially reducing the net benefit Amazon receives
from drone operations below 200 feet AGL.202 Amazon’s expected net benefit, NBA,
is its net benefit from Q drone operations, NB(Q), less the damages it can expect to
pay to the landowner under a trespass action.203
Table 3
Q

NB(Q)

MNBQ

NBA

MNBA

C(Q)

E(D)

W(Q)

1

$1.50

$1.00

$1.38

$0.63

$0.50

$0.13

$1.01

1.333

$1.78

$0.67

$1.48

$0.00

$0.89

$0.30

$0.89

2

$2.00

$0.00

$1.00

($1.50)

$2.00

$1.00

$0.00

3

$1.50

($1.00)

($1.88)

($4.38)

$4.50

$3.38

($3.00)

4

$0.00

($2.00)

($8.00)

($8.00)

$8.00

$8.00

($8.00)

Although Amazon’s net benefit, NB(Q), is maximized at Q = 2, Amazon’s
expected net benefit, NBA, is maximized at Q = 1.333. At this level of drone activity
below 200 feet, Amazon has a 33% chance of being successfully sued by the
landowner (or a 67% chance of rebutting the presumption of trespass). Amazon’s
expected net benefit is $1.48. The landowner’s expected compensation for
interference is $0.30, leaving $0.59 uncompensated. Thus, the net wealth generated
by this rule is $0.89 ($1.48 less $0.59), whereas the maximum increase in net wealth

200. For a list of the factors, see Draft for Drafting Committee Meeting, supra note 7, §
301(d)(1)–(9).
201. If the landowner has the right to exclude, then a verbal manifestation to Amazon that
its drone operations are not welcome would increase the likelihood the landowner would sue
Amazon, as well as the difficulty of rebutting the presumption, resulting in a rule closely
resembling strict liability.
202. Amazon’s new net benefit formula is NB(Q) = 2Q – 1 2 Q2, where MNBQ = -Q + 2.
The author has slightly altered the formula used by Landes and Posner to illustrate the effects
of the reduction of net benefit. See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 82, at 62–68.
203. The full equation used in the model is NBA = 2Q – 1 2 Q2 – (0.25)(Q) 1 2 Q2, where
MNBA = 2 – Q – (0.375)Q2. See supra note 184.
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that can be achieved is $4. The result is a DWL of $3.11, illustrated in Figure 4
below.
Figure 4

2. Drone Zoning
This Section will provide a normative economic analysis of the second alternative,
which leaves it to each state to recognize “a right of landowners in the airspace
appurtenant to their land extending to various heights depending primarily upon the
use and location of the land,”204 based on the exclusion versus governance theory
articulated by Henry E. Smith205 and the arguments put forth by Troy A. Rule for
drone zoning.206 Similar to the distinction between property rights and liability
rules,207 Smith argues that it makes sense to distinguish between exclusion and
governance as proxies to measure the costs and benefits of different methods of
delineating rights to a resource that is rising in value.208 “The resources that are the
subject of [these] property rights can . . . be thought of as bundles of valued attributes,
each of which is costly to measure.”209 Exclusion roughly measures “what collection
of attributes is treated as a unit” so we can identify the resource for the purposes of
regulating access to that resource, whereas governance rules regulate access to the
resource by determining what range of activities are allowed.210 Exclusion rights are
enforced through basic trespass and property law, whereas governance can use a wide
range of rules, such as nuisance law and zoning regulations, to provide a higher
degree of delineation of rights to resources through specification of proper

204. Draft for Drafting Committee Meeting, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1) (Alternative B).
205. See generally Smith, supra note 143.
206. See generally Troy A. Rule, Drone Zoning, 95 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2016).
207. See supra Section III.A.
208. See Smith, supra note 143, at S455, S467 (“[E]xclusion and governance are strategies
that are at the poles of a continuum of methods of measurement . . . .”).
209. Id. at S454.
210. Id. at S454–55, S467.
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activities.211 The “roughness” of the measurement used to define a right is referred
to as precision.212 Further precision through exclusion “can be achieved by focusing
on proxies that measure ever smaller classes of uses,” such as redefining boundary
lines, making the resource more difficult to use without the right holder’s
permission.213 Further precision through governance can be achieved by holding an
actor liable for interference with another’s right to use of a resource.214
The goal of the ULC’s second alternative appears to be further precision through
exclusion by requiring each state to explicitly define the boundaries of private land,
depending on the location of the land—location being rural, urban, suburban, and
agricultural.215 The ULC might argue that the emergence of such exclusive, private
property rights is necessary to internalize the privacy costs currently borne by the
landowners to the drone operators.216 However, the emergence of exclusive property
rights in a resource of rising value usually arises because that resource can be used
more productively with exclusion rights, thereby internalizing that increase in value
to the private owners.217 Unlike traditional uses of land,218 the rising value in lowaltitude airspace due to the changing technologies and capabilities of drones can only
be exploited by allowing commercial drones to use that low-altitude airspace;
landowners can only exploit the increase in value through market transactions, which
are likely prohibited due to high transaction costs. Thus, governance rules—such as
specifically tailored nuisance and liability laws or drone zoning regulations219—are
likely preferable to giving landowners the right to exclude.
Although the second alternative proposed by the ULC may be a useful tool for
increasing precision in the future—when the integration of drones into the national
airspace is further along and the commercial use of low-altitude airspace is more
developed—a more appropriate and efficient method for increasing precision in the
delineation of airspace rights might be “drone zoning.”220 Professor Troy Rule argues
that local regulation of drones by municipalities would allow for a greater degree of

211. Id. at S455 n.5.
212. “[P]recision itself [is] a bundle of measurable properties but not measurable itself.
Precision in property rights could be termed lack of vagueness, fine grainedness, accuracy,
exactness, complexity, and the like.” Id. at S472. The degree of precision correlates with the
degree of specification. Id. at S473. “Rights are precise or specified to the extent that they
protect attributes by preventing a range of unauthorized actions.” Id.
213. Id. at S467, S469.
214. See id. at S468 (discussing governance methods in grazing commons).
215. See supra notes 196–197 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
217. See Smith, supra note 143, at S453 (“The emergence of exclusive, private property
rights is said to help solve the ‘tragedy of the commons,’ because the new private owners will
bear more of the changes in resource values that their activities cause.”).
218. See id. at S461 (stating that with the rising value of wool and technological changes
that allowed sheep to be raised on less land, the open-field grazing commons in England
eventually gave way to a trend toward private enclosure (exclusion) as the “overall attainable
level of production” began to rise).
219. Zoning and neighborhood covenants are governance mechanisms for increasing
precision. See id. at S456.
220. See generally Rule, supra note 206.
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precision and efficiency that would not otherwise be attainable.221 First, enabling
municipalities to contribute to a comprehensive drone regulatory regime would be
more efficient than drawing a strict line in the sky because they have greater access
to firsthand, local information,222 potentially putting them in a better position to
assuage some of the concerns regarding the nuisance of drone flights and anxiety
over the invasion of privacy within their communities.223 Second, municipalities
have a long history of regulating low-altitude airspace under common municipal
ordinance provisions, such as those setting building setbacks and height restrictions,
which “effectively designate the low-altitude airspace near the homes involved . . .
as a valuable seclusion buffer that reciprocally benefits residents below.”224 Rule
argues that local government officials are “better positioned than the FAA to
determine which of these two competing airspace uses—drone activity or
preservation of seclusion—to prioritize in each specific neighborhood.”225 Lastly, the
advancements in drone technologies and the resulting proliferation of drones
“necessitate a location-sensitive regulatory approach that only localities are equipped
to effectively establish and enforce.”226 Late nineteenth and early twentieth century
courts and policymakers justified the emergence of municipal land use controls,
including zoning laws, with similar arguments.227 Rule argues that the proliferation
of drones increasingly spawns conflicts that trespass, nuisance, and broad federal
regulations do not adequately address; just as policymakers turned to municipal
zoning to manage the growing volume of land use conflicts, “drone zoning could
serve a similar function as drones increasingly compete for the use of low-altitude
airspace . . . .” 228
In theory, the second alternative could be used in tandem with drone zoning to
provide a cause of action in trespass at a clearly specified height that the state
determines is appropriate based on a broad geographic classification system of rural,
urban, suburban, and agricultural airspace.229 Rule argues that state governments are
best positioned to clarify landowners’ property rights through state statutes. 230
However, Rule argues for increased precision, with respect to these rights, through
exclusion rather than governance at the state level because it “would make it easier
for parties to negotiate drone-related covenants and easements involving [lowaltitude airspace].”231 This Note, however, has presented an in-depth argument based
on a positive economic analysis of the various rules proposed by the ULC that

221. Id. at 176.
222. Id. at 176–77.
223. See WhiteFox Def. Techs., Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Uniform Tort Law
Relating to Drones Act, supra note 49, at 1 (“We find it plausible that, as ULC says, property
owners could suffer from the nuisance of drone flights and anxiety over the invasion of
privacy.”).
224. See Rule, supra note 2066, at 178.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 179.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 181.
229. See supra text accompanying note 199.
230. See Rule, supra note 206, at 170–71.
231. Id. at 171–72; see generally Rule, supra note 19.
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suggests otherwise. Moreover, Rule’s argument is premised on the assumption that
transaction costs are low.232 Section III.B.2 provided several arguments—in addition
to the lack of information available to justify a low transaction cost assumption—
that transaction costs are likely to be prohibitively high, so as to prevent mutually
beneficial transactions from occurring.
Nevertheless, a combination of a state law that clarifies landowners’ property
rights “by focusing on proxies that measure ever smaller classes of uses,”233 such as
further delineation of landowners’ rights based on their location and governance
rules through municipal drone zoning ordinances, may increase efficiency by filling
in the gaps not currently addressed by the common law aerial trespass doctrine. For
example, the state may find that, in general, drones should be excluded below 100
feet AGL in urban areas, where parcel sizes tend to be relatively small and closer
together, because the ability of drones to capture detailed images increases the
likelihood of invasions of privacy by drones.234 The statute would be efficient so long
as it also gives local municipalities “broad regulatory authority” to regulate drones
below this level through its zoning powers.235 This would be done by creating a cause
of action in trespass for landowners, subject to the local drone zoning ordinances that
may allow certain uses of that space by drones—for example, an ordinance may
distinguish between commercial and recreation drone uses and allow commercial
drones to operate only during business hours on weekdays but limit recreational
drone activity by prohibiting it altogether or to a narrower set of places and times.236
Returning to the Amazon example, such a combination of exclusion rules at the
state level and governance rules at the local level would reduce drone delivery
activity in communities by restricting drone operations in certain locations and at
certain times where the drone may potentially cause a nuisance or anxiety over the
intrusion of privacy. Yet it would still allow Amazon to exploit the rising value of
the airspace by implementing its drone delivery services in that community, which
would benefit the community as well as Amazon.237
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important part of Rule’s article is that he recognizes that both
“state and municipal involvement, in coordination with the federal government, is
needed to facilitate the efficient evolution of drone law.”238 Drone law is still in its
infancy stage. Part 107 was only the first phase in what the FAA expects to be a

232. See Rule, supra note 19, at 193–94 (arguing that new drone technologies are reducing
the “cost of internalization”).
233. Smith, supra note 143, at S467; see supra text accompanying note 215.
234. See Rule, supra note 206, at 181 (discussing the ability of drones to get visual access
into a secluded yard in urban areas); see also supra notes 14–16.
235. See Rule, supra note 206, at 176 n.216 (“In most cases a special enabling act . . . gives
the locality the power to zone.”) (quoting WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING
LAWS 22 (1985)).
236. See id. at 196.
237. For the potential benefits to Amazon, as well as consumers, see supra note 116–117
and accompanying text.
238. Rule, supra note 206, at 199 (emphasis added).
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fifteen-year (or more) process of integrating drones into the national airspace.239
Public perception of drones may change drastically over that period as federal
regulations are amended to allow new commercial uses of drones that allow
companies like Amazon to share the value of low-altitude airspace with their
customers through cheaper, faster services and through the environmental benefits
that come with using drones.240 Not to mention the new, transformative technology
that might be introduced over the next decade “that could be as disruptive as the
advent of automobiles.”241 Thus, state legislatures should reject the ULC’s proposed
aerial trespass rules as presently written to avoid adopting an inefficient and
inflexible solution solely to assuage public concerns about drones. Such concerns
would be better addressed through more flexible liability and governance rules.

239. See FAA UAS ROADMAP, supra note 10 (stating that integration of passenger drones
and air taxis is the last phase of drone integration into the national airspace and may take
another fifteen years).
240. For example, drones that replace commercial delivery trucks could help reduce urban
pollution and energy consumption. Rule, supra note 19, at 162–63 (citing Jim Lyza, Could
Drones Give Your Package a Sustainable Lift?, GREENBIZ (May 2, 2014),
https://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/05/02/could-drones-give-your-package-sustainable-lift
[https://perma.cc/QZ7H-6DLY]).
241. Cohn et al., supra note 2.

